Tuesday, August 16, 2005

Whimmitude and Resistence


Why do Western women allow Islamic exceptionalism to dominate the discourse of universal Womens' Rights? What makes a Muslim woman less valuable a person than a non-Muslim? Why is it ok for a Muslim father to punch his 15 year old daughter in the face in a crowded movie theatre but wrong to pound that arsehole into the ground? Or to complain, for that matter?

We call that female subjugation of females "whimmitude."

Why do Europeans protest against capital punishment in America but remain silent when Muslim women are murdered with impunity in Europe itself?

Below we have excerpted an essay by Ayaan Hirsi Ali followed by an article on women/girls married in Islamic rites, and finally an apologetic by a THE BBC2 who sets us kafirs straight.

Unfree Under Islam

Shariah endangers women's rights, from Iraq to Canada.

BY AYAAN HIRSI ALI
Tuesday, August 16, 2005 12:01 a.m. EDT

In every society where family affairs are regulated according to instructions derived from the Shariah or Islamic law, women are disadvantaged. The injustices these women are exposed to in the name of Islam vary from extreme cruelty (forced marriages; imprisonment or death after rape) to grossly unfair treatment in matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance.

It seems strange to associate the context of Canada with that of Iraq, but a closer look at the arguments used to reassure the demonstrating women in both countries [Iraq] reveals the similar ordeals that Muslim women in both countries must go through to secure their rights. It shows how their legitimate and serious worries are trivialized, and how vulnerable and alone they are. It shows how the Free World led by the U.S. went to war in Iraq, allegedly to bring liberty to Iraqis, and is compromising the basic rights of women in order to meet a random date. It shows how the theory of multiculturalism in Western liberal democracies is working against women in ethnic and religious minorities with misogynist practices. It shows the tenacity of many imams, mullahs and self-made Muslim radicals to subjugate women in the name of God. Most of all, it shows how many of those who consider themselves liberal or left-wing see their energy levels rise when it comes to Bush-bashing, but lose their voice when women's rights are threatened by religious obscurantism.

Hamam Hamoudi, the head of Iraq's constitution committee, refuses to discuss the article that worries the Muslim women. He also refused to put in the draft constitution that men and women have equal rights, creating a bizarre situation whereby the women had more rights under Saddam Hussein's regime than in post-Saddam Iraq. Mr. Hamoudi insists that women will have full economic and political rights, but the overwhelming evidence shows that when Shariah--which gives a husband complete control over his wife--is in place, women have little chance to exercise any political rights. Does Mr. Hamoudi realize that it took the removal of Saddam and the establishment of a multiparty democracy for men to vote, while if his draft constitution is ratified, women will need the permission of their husbands to step out of the house in order to mark their ballot? I thought that President Bush and all the allies who supported the Iraq war aspired to bring democracy and liberty to all Iraqis. Aren't Iraqi girls and women human enough to share in that dream?

Under Shariah, a girl becomes eligible for marriage from the moment she starts to menstruate. In countries where Islamic law is practiced, child-brides are common. Do the drafters of the constitution grasp what this will mean for the school curriculum of girls or the risks of miscarriages, maternal fatalities and infant deaths? These and other hazards that affect subjugated women are common phenomena in the 22 Arab-Islamic countries investigated in the Arab Human Development Report. An early marriage also means many children in an area of the world that is already overpopulated and poor.

The draft Iraqi bill of rights favors men in other respects, such as the right to marry up to four wives, and the right to an easy divorce, without the interference of a court, simply by repeating "I divorce you" in the presence of two male witnesses. A wife divorced in such a fashion will receive an allowance for a period of three months to one year, and after that period nothing. On the other hand, if a wife wants a divorce, she must go to court and prove that her husband does not meet her material needs, that he is infertile and that he is impotent. Once a divorce is finalized, if there are children, the custody of the children will automatically go to the father (for boys at age 7 and for girls from the start of menstruation). Inheritance based on the Shariah means that wives will get only a small portion of the property of their husbands and a sister will get half what her brother gets.

Canadian women are told that the Arbitration Act of 1992 was passed in order to provide citizens with the opportunity to resolve minor conflicts through mediation and thereby save valuable court time. They are reassured that Muslim women in Canada have nothing to fear because parties must enter into arbitration out of their free choice, and that there are enough limits to safeguard the rights of women. The Muslim women's arguments that "free choice" is relative when you are psychologically, financially and socially dependent on your family, clan or religious group seem to fall on deaf ears. The populations of battered Muslim women in "tolerant" Canada's women's shelters seem to be ignored. In Canada, battered Muslim women say that their husbands told them that it is a God-given right to hit them. If the current Iraqi constitution goes through, Iraqi wife-abusers will be able to add "It is my constitutional right to beat you."

Ms. Hirsi Ali, a member of the Dutch parliament for the Liberal Party, was born in Somalia. She took refuge in the Netherlands in 1992 to escape an arranged marriage, and has had armed bodyguards after receiving death threats from Muslim extremists. She writes at http://www.ayaanhirsiali.web-log.nl/.


http://www.opinionjournal.com

***

HYDERABAD: Plunging the bride bazaar of Old City to newer depths, marriage brokers last month paraded 13 young girls before four Arabs, all aged over 50.

One of the grooms, a 55-year-old sheikh from UAE, chose a 16-year-old girl, married her on July 15, spent two weeks with her and then left the country after pronouncing talaq thrice in a huff.

The marriage was facilitated by Mumtaz Begum of Falaknuma with help from four brokers — Mansoor, Toufiq, Yousuf and Abdullah.

Police officer Sandeep Sandilya said, "The brides were paraded before the Arabs in Toufiq's house at Kalapathar and the nikah was solemnised by a qazi at his residence in Shalibanda.''

With her hopes of going abroad shattered, Shameem (name changed) approached the Kalapathar police on Saturday seeking help.

The police acted swiftly and nabbed Mumtaz Begum but the brokers and qazi are still at large. The police recovered three affidavits which claimed Shameem's age as 22 and stated her consent to marry the aged Arab.

Shameem told police that the brokers pressured her to accept nikah with Mohammad Bakram as he promised to take her to the UAE after marriage.

She said, "Once I said manzoor hai, the qazi pronounced the nikah over. The sheikh took me to a lodge in Chandrayangutta and did not let me out for 10 days. When I complained of chest pain, he gave me tablets and sleeping pills. As the pain became unbearable, my mother came to the lodge to take me home where a doctor gave me glucose. The sheikh came to our house the same evening, but I refused to go with him.''

That, however, didn't spell an end to her troubles. "He came again the next day and forced me to go with him. After four days, I developed similar complications and went back to my house. Within hours, he was at my doorstep threatening to divorce me if did not go with him. When I refused bluntly, he uttered talaq thrice and walked away,'' she added.

Sandilya said the Arab had paid Rs 20,000 to brokers for the marriage, out of which the girl's parents were given Rs 10,000.

He added that police were trying to find out the sheikh's address and would seek his arrest through Interpol. "The qazi was supposed to maintain a record of both bride and groom,'' the police officer said.
***

A World Where Womanhood Reigns Supreme
(The Seeds of My Own Re-evaluations)

When I joined the team of "Living Islam" two years ago, my perception of Islam was dominated by prejudice and ignorance, and I found its treatment of women abhorrent. To me the veil symbolised the oppression of women, making them invisible, anonymous and voiceless, and the cause of this oppression lay in the will to perpetuate the family and maintain a patriarchal framework - the very basis of an Islamic Society. I thought women were entirely submerged by divine justification of their role as wife and mother.

"Living Islam" was filmed over two years in 19 different countries and on location I was a lone female in an otherwise male team. I was aware that I especially should behave appropriately. In my mind, women were to be neither seen nor heard. My first trip took me to Mali - to an untypical Muslim community in the bush. Making sure to cover every bit of naked flesh while the men wandered around in short sleeves, I wondered what rooms I was permitted to enter and who I was permitted to talk to. But I also wondered whether my new-found meekness was not in part a reaction to the overpowering atmosphere of the patriarchal society I found my self in. Was this how Muslim women felt - resignation in the face of impossible odds?

The first Muslim woman I met in Mali was far removed from my preconception about the Muslim female. She was the wife of a Shaikh dedicated to converting pagan villagers to Islam. A sophisticated, well-educated woman, previously married to a diplomat, she had renounced a Western lifestyle for a life in purdah. In my eyesshe had sentenced herself to life imprisonment. But here was no prisoner, no poor downtrodden slave. A sharp intelligent and influential woman stood before me, clearly the one "who wore trousers" round here. Here seclusion gave her a status of honour and allowed her to exercise control from behind closed doors without confrontation. She was the bargainer, the head of the household, and the manager of her husbands affairs and schedule.

The emancipated woman in the West faces the conflict between confirmation of her femininity and the privileges that she associates with it, and repudiation of the confines of her female role and all the limitations that men want her to assume. From where I stood, this woman had transformed those limitations into priviliges.

On my next trip to northern Nigeria I met twoi more women who would alter my views even further. These were two women from the household of Shaikh Zakzaky, a fervent preacher of Jihad who urges his supporters to follow the example of Iran and replace the imerialistic western regime with an Islamic state. Zeenah Ibraheem, Zakzaky's wife and Fatima Yunus, her friend, had agreed to be interviewed about the role of women in Islam. They were in purdah and would only speak to another woman. The producer asked me to interview them. I was nervous apart from the fact that I had never interviewed anyone before. I was worred that my feminist sympathies would antagonise the women. But it was precisely these sympathies that Zeenah and Fatima themselves were questioning. Once again, the women were educated and articulate. And once again they had rejected the Western lifestyle which I considered so superior to Islam in its treatment of women.

As I took my seat on a carpet in the courtyard, the invisible boundary between men and women was a welcome partition, and within this boundary womanhood reigned supreme. This was a sharp contrast with the feelings from the previous days in locations where my presence had been acceptable only as an "honarary man". We had been filming the medieval theatrics of the 'Salla' celebrations that marked the end of Ramadan. Men, men, men everywhere: 500,000 men gathered for prayer on the morning of the Salla, men pouring into the inner courtyard of the Emirof Kano's inner courtyard to pay homage - I was grateful to be allowed to witness these events but at what price? The complete annihilation of my female identity?

But now I was taking the reins because of my sex. No more the feeling of inferiority and exclusion, as a novice in things Islamic surrounded by a team of experts, as a woman in a patriarchal society. Now the men were excluded. Apart from the cameraman and sound recordist, they were encouraged to stand well back. The cameraman covered his head and the camera with a black cloth - his very own veil. I was now in a world where the men had no voice.

The women talked and in their answers I saw the seeds of my own re-evalutions. They argued that the veil signified their rejection of an unacceptable system of values which debased women while Islam elevated women to a position of honour and respect. "It is not liberation where you say women should go naked. It is just oppression, because men want to see them naked." Just as to us the veil represents Muslim oppression, to them miniskirts and plunging necklines represent oppression. They said that men are cheating women in the West. They let us believe we're liberated but enslave us to the male gaze. However much I insist on the right to choose what I wear, I cannot deny that the choice is often dictated by what will make my body more attractive to men. Women cannot separate their identity from their appearance and so we remain trapped in the traditional feminine world, where the rules are written by men.

By choosing to wear the veil, these women were making a conscious decision to define their role in society and their relationship with men. That relationship appeard to be based more on exchange and mutual respect (a respect that was often lacking in the personal relationships I saw in the West), than the master/servant scenario I had anticipated. The Veil to them signified visual confirmation of their religious commitment, in which men and women were united, and for Zeenah and Fatima an even stronger commitment to a political ideal.

So were my notions of oppression in the form of the veil disqualified? If my definition of equality was free will then I could no longer define that oppression as a symptom of Islam. The women had all excercised their right to choose. To some extent, they were freer than me - I had less control over my destiny. I could no longer point at them and say they were oppressed and I was not. my life was influenced by male approval as theirs - but the element of choice had been taken out of mine. their situations and their arguments had, after all, served to highlight shortcomings in my view of my own liberty.

MARY WALKER

Mary Walker was Production Coordinator on the BBC2 series "Living Islam". Article courtesy of Impact Magazine
***

Monday, August 15, 2005

Presbyterians Want Your Money to Further Peace


I wrote earlier elsewhere today about our buddy Clarence, an obese retarded guy who drops into the shop from time-to-time to visit us. A smug little girl has a blog http://palestineencounter.blogspot.com at which she relates how she stood up for the rights of the oppressed in Bethlehem against Israeli soldiers. I wrote about Clar. at her blog. It's got me thinking about the time Clar. was here standing around drooling and gazing into space, doing not much. Suddenly one of the people at the shop shouted at him: "You've shat yourself!"

He had. It lay in a pool around his feet. With the shouting and the laughter, Clar. got flustered, ran in circles, and made a further mess. He was embarrassed and afraid. Next thing he was crying. He's a big guy, and it's hard to calm him when he's nervous or afraid. We got him into the men's room, mopped the floor, and went back to normal.

But let me put it clearly here: Grown men laughed at him and taunted him.

No man who's ever changed a baby's diaper, who's cared for a sick child, who's tended a comrade in the field, no man who's buried his parents can have anything but contempt for those who'd laugh. We get many kinds of people here, many of whom are marginal at best. They're welcome. But not those who're so low that they pick on the weak or the defenceless. There's a limit, and the PCUSA has reached it-- passed beyond it.

Proud to be a Presbyterian...

[This was taken from the PCUSA website here]
Media inquiries should be directed to Barry Creech, (888)728-7228 ext. 5127

Church draws focus on five corporations it says impede efforts to secure a just peace among Israelis and Palestinians

Seattle, August 5 , 2005 -- Today, the Mission Responsibility through Investment (MRTI) Committee of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) announced that it will begin its process of 'progressive engagement' with five companies it says contribute to the ongoing violence that plagues Israel and Palestine. The Committee's action is in response to a resolution passed last year by the Church's General Assembly and is consistent with the Church's long-standing practice of ensuring its investments are used to further the Church's mission.

The 2004 General Assembly adopted a seven-part resolution affirming its longstanding opposition to the occupation and taking action to demonstrate its convictions. It instructed the Mission Responsibility Through Investment Committee (MRTI) to begin a process of phased, selective divestment of stock in companies whose operations support the occupation.
* * * * * * * * * *

Our work with Christian partners also informs our deep concern for human rights issues. In Israel/Palestine, the Church has been a consistent advocate for Israel's right to exist and Palestinians' right to self-determination. It has also spoken out consistently against violence, terrorism, anti-Semitism, the Occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, and the Separation Barrier.

My thoughts: There are times that being part of a mainline denomination is frustrating. There are times when I ask myself, "Why do I really want to be a Presbyterian?" There are times when I just think that the 'institutional/organized' church is not the place for me and I need to seek out other places to do ministry in the future. But then there are other times when I'm proud of Presbyterians (some) and what they are doing. One of the up-sides to being a fairly large mainline denomination with some money is that you DO have it invested in a variety of places and one way to take a stand against injustice in the world is to do what threatens and speaks most loudly sometimes - threaten to take away your money, to pull-out, to dis-invest from certain companies. Although this decision is NOT to automatically dis-invest from these companies, but rather to begin a process, a process that includes dialogue to get these companies to think about what they are doing and how they are being involved in the fate of the Palestinian people. I think the MRTI Committee is making a good move with announcing this and looking into these companies. It will be interesting to see how conservative PCUSAers respond to this action - but I am in full support of any decision within the PCUSA to look into divesting from companies that are sponsoring (knowingly or maybe even possibly unknowingly) the violence against the Palestinians and adding to the Israeli advantage in the Israeli-Palestine conflict.

02:21 AM in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict | Permalink
***

Israel isn't sick or helpless. Israel is more like a new kid in the neighbourhood, and the bullies are going crazy trying to beat him. The Presbyterian Church of the USA is aiding the Moslems, helping them in the effort to continue the murder of civilians of all nations in the area, encouraging murder of women, children, babies, anyone at all. The vile and repugnant pretense of fairness is lower than the scummy behaviour of those who taunted our pal Clar. PCUSA plays up to the thugs, curries favor among the killers for the sake of looking like the liberals they want to be, looking like Dan Brown clones, looking like stylish and sophisticated cool guys. It's a pose, and they're taking some heat for the resulting dead bodies and the continued threats of more to come.

They delete letter after letter, day after day, by those who write in to object to the PCUSA stance. They haven't realised until recently that there are too many people who are disgusted by them for them to continue their pose unopposed. PCUSA has backed murderers, and now they're seen doing so by many. They want your money. They also want to be cool. They're not welcome here. Not in this shop. We get drug addicts and lunatics here, thieves and scumbags I won't begin to describe. But there's a limit to who we let in. PCUSA wants your money. I'd rather give mine to a crack-head.

We tossed losers out of this place because they taunted a retarded man. I'd have them back before I'd let in a Presbyterian from the PCUSA clergy. They want your money.

Ideology, Derrida, Aporia


How do we approach the greater world in terms of analysis? How do we make sense of our societies and politics? How do we know if what we think is true truly is so? Is multi-culturalism a good thing or is the People, the Land, the Leader what we should look to for our organizing principle? Often, it seems, where we depart from determines where we arrive.

Below we have two essays on intellectual approaches to epistemology. In this our time we are faced with the decay of ideology and the stagnant remains of nihilism. Now we have an "Ideology of Duh!"

The essays below are straight-forward, and we feel little need to interfere here in the reader's interpretations of these texts. They show the history of our present situation regarding the rise of Left fascist dhimmitude, of fascist pandering to Islamic exceptionalism, of Moslem triumphalism. With these essays one comes closer to putting together the puzzle pieces that make up the meme of our time, the dominant discourse that informs us all, to some or other extent. Here we leave the reader to the texts. (OK, we fibbed a bit. The emphases are from the ed.)
***

Dictionary of the history of ideas

http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv2-60

Sociological Approaches.
A watershed in the study
of the ideology concept was reached in the works of
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who viewed ideology
as a system of false ideas, a statement of class position,
and a justification for class rule. Ideologies are second-
ary and unreal, since they are part of the "superstruc-
ture" and as such a reflection of the more fundamental
material economic "base." [Religion, for example, is seen as a superstructure on the base of capitalism, a prop of the ideological result capitalism. Prior to the capitalist mode of production religion was a superstructure used by the feudal base power structure to legitimize feudal rule.]

One's thought and belief patterns, Marxist theory
holds, are conditioned by one's socioeconomic exist-
ence. Socioeconomic relationships, particularly prop-
erty relationships, set the stage for man's bondage and
"alienation." They dehumanize man by thwarting his
creative impulses. They separate man from himself, his
productivity, and the society to which he belongs.
Socioeconomic relationships are institutionalized in
social classes. One's ideology is therefore a function
of the class to which one belongs. More specifically,
ideologies are deliberate creations of false images by
the dominant class to manipulate and control the
masses, and to perpetuate its own rule. "The ideas of
the ruling class," wrote Marx and Engels, "are in every
epoch the ruling ideas: i.e. the class, which is the ruling
material force of society, is at the same time its ruling
intellectual force" (The German Ideology, p. 39).

Marx and Engels attached a derogatory connotation
to ideology, since they viewed all ideological thought
as the dishonest use of reasoning, as the conscious or
unconscious distortion of facts in order to justify the
position of the ruling class. Ideology represents, in
Engels' memorable phrase, "false consciousness."
The proposition that false consciousness may provide
a basis for action suggests, as many have pointed out,
that ideas and ideologies enjoy a measure of autonomy
—a realization that runs counter to Marx's earlier
assertion about the dependence of ideas on the eco-
nomic system. Engels was to explain, after Marx's
death, that Marx had indeed overemphasized the eco-
nomic factor, and for a good reason. He wrote: "Marx
and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that
younger writers sometimes lay more stress on the eco-
nomic side than is due to it. We had to emphasize this
main principle in opposition to our adversaries, who
denied it, and we had not always the time, the place
or the opportunity to allow the other elements involved
in the interaction to come into their own rights"
(Selected Correspondence, p. 477). However, Engels
maintained, although there is no inflexible one-way
relationship between idea systems and economic sys-
tems, sooner or later the two will coincide.

Marx and Engels, by basing ideas on the socioeco-
nomic system, raised an issue that, at the hand of Karl
Mannheim, came to be known as the "sociology of
knowledge": the study of social bases, conditions,
varieties, and distortions of ideas. To this extent, soci-
ology of knowledge is reminiscent of the epistemologi-
cal approach to ideology, except that Mannheim pro-
posed to elevate the enterprise to a truly scientific
status devoted to the unmasking of the ideological
biases in thought.

Mannheim's approach differed from Marx's in im-
portant respects. Influenced by Max Weber, Mannheim
abandoned Marx's primarily class approach and based
ideology on the total social structure, particularly polit-
ical parties. (This prompted some scholars like R. K.
Merton in his Social Theory and Social Structure
[New York, 1957, p. 490] to call Mannheim a "bour-
geois Marx," a label that was applied earlier to Weber.)
Moreover, Mannheim argued, Marx's approach had
inappropriately fused two distinctive types of ideology:
the "particular" and the "total."

The particular conception of ideology denotes that
"we are skeptical of the ideas and representations
advanced by our opponent," because "they are re-
garded as more or less conscious disguises of the real
nature of a situation, the true recognition of which
would not be in accord with his interests." It includes
"all those utterances the `falsity' of which is due to
intentional or unintentional, conscious, semiconscious,
or unconscious, deluding of one's self or of others,
taking place on a psychological level and structurally
resembling lies." Page 555, Volume 2. This conception is "particular" because "it always refers only to specific assertions which may be regarded as concealments, falsifications, or lies
without attacking the integrity of the total mental
structure of the asserting subject" (Mannheim, pp.
55-56, 265-66). [Yes, dear reader, that last sentence was incredibly idiotic, but our alternative is to rewrite the essay here, which is in its own inimitable fashion, interesting and valuable for the sake of our thesis. We ask that you please struggle through.]

Mannheim contrasts the particular conception of
ideology to the total conception: "Here we refer to
the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social
group, e.g. of a class, when we are concerned with
the characteristics and composition of the total struc-
ture of the mind of this epoch or of this group" (ibid.,
p. 56). The total conception, in other words, refers to
the Weltanschauung of an age or of a historical group.
The two conceptions of ideology have in common
the fact that they are determined by one's social cir-
cumstances. Beyond this they differ in some important
respects: (1) the particular conception calls into ques-
tion only a portion of the opponent's assertions,
whereas the total conception challenges the opponent's
entire world-outlook and admits of no nonideological
thought; (2) the particular conception rests on a psy-
chological analysis of ideas, whereas the total concep-
tion operates at an epistemological-ontological level
wherein the entire "thought-system" is analyzed as
socially-historically determined; (3) the particular con-
ception is associated largely with individuals, the total
conception with collectivities; (4) the particular con-
ception historically precedes the total conception.

Mannheim draws a further distinction between
"ideology" and "utopia." Ideology, according to this
formulation, is an idea system congruent with, and
supportive of, the status quo. Utopia, by contrast, is
an idea system opposed to the status quo and support-
ive of an alternative social order. Only those mental
orientations are utopian, Mannheim holds, "which,
when they pass over into conduct, tend to shatter,
either partially or wholly, the order of things prevailing
at the time" (ibid., p. 192). The ideology-utopia dis-
tinction is rather farfetched, however, since either
concept may be simultaneously opposed to (or sup-
portive of) a given status quo and supportive of (or
opposed to) a rival one.

Conclusions strikingly similar to those of Marx were
reached via an entirely different route by two early
European sociologists, Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo
Pareto, who were in some respects the intellectual
nemesis of Marx. Mosca and Pareto believe in a scien-
tific approach to social analysis. To be fruitful, they
maintain, social science must be objective; to be objec-
tive, it must rest on observable and verifiable grounds.
The most fundamental fact of social existence is that
human society at all times has been characterized by
a fundamental division between a minority that rules
and a majority that is ruled, between elite and mass.
According to Mosca, the most decisive feature of
any society is its ruling class. A society's art, culture,
politics, religion, etc., are all determined by the domi-
nant social stratum. As such, social analysis must begin
and end with the ruling class—its origin, development,
composition, and change. Politics consists of violent
struggles among contending groups for power, for the
ruling positions in society. The leaders maintain, per-
petuate, rationalize, and justify their own rule through
the skillful manipulation of "political formulas" or
ideologies.

Pareto stresses the prevalence of the irrational in
human conduct. He insists, under the influence of
Freudian psychology, that significant portions of
human behavior are motivated and sustained by non-
logical drives lying well below the level of conscious-
ness. Man's conduct is governed as much by uncon-
scious habit as by deliberate choice.

Pareto's approach is also influenced by a conception
of "myth" developed by Georges Sorel. All society,
according to Sorel, is guided and directed by myth;
the myth is the most important factor in social life.
A myth consists of a body of symbols and images
capable of evoking sentiment and propelling men to
action. More specifically, a myth has two components:
a statement of goals or objectives, and a commitment
to a line of action toward the materialization of the
objectives. A myth, in other words, is an "expression
of a determination to act" (Sorel, p. 50); it binds a
group of people together, taps their sentiment and
emotion, and directs their energy toward specific ob-
jectives. The most important function of any leadership
group is to provide the appropriate myth for a society.

Pareto divides all human conduct into two categor-
ies—logical and nonlogical—in terms of whether it
employs suitable means in pursuit of attainable objec-
tives. He contends that most human action is non-
logical, and that nonlogical action is especially per-
vasive in the sociopolitical realm. All societies, he
points out, are filled with taboos, magic, and myths.
In the political realm, codes, constitutions, platforms,
and programs fail to meet the criteria of logical action,
since, among other things, they are stated in the
vaguest, most rhetorical, most meaningless terms.

Pareto distinguishes two types of nonlogical action:
"residues" and "derivations." Residues refer to a fairly
small number of constant factors—"nuclei"—in human
behavior that change little from age to age, culture
to culture. Derivations consist of the large number of
factors that change rapidly with time and place; they
are manifestations and expressions of residues. Page 556, Volume 2.

Derivations are the verbal expressions—including "ideolo-
gies"—that seek to explain, rationalize, and justify the
residues through appeal to sentiment, emotion, custom,
and tradition. Residues and derivations are interde-
pendent; they are motive forces of social conduct. (It
is interesting to note Krishna P. Mukerji's comment
that Pareto's theory of residues and derivations is a
variation on Marx's theory of base and superstructure;
Mukerji, p. 17.)

The concept of ideology, then, is a major variable
in these writers' analyses of society. Used synonymously
with "myth," "political formula," or "derivation," ide-
ology is viewed as the matrix of social behavior, the
guiding force in human society, and the principal
means for attaining social solidarity. It is approached
as an instrument for leadership manipulation and con-
trol of the masses, a means for rationalizing, legitimiz-
ing, and perpetuating a given state of affairs.

Among contemporary sociologists, Talcott Parsons
and Daniel Bell deserve special attention. In general,
Parsons defines ideology as "an empirical belief system
held in common by the members of any collectivity."
More specifically:
An ideology... is a system of beliefs, held in common by
the members of a collectivity, i.e., a society, or a sub-
collectivity of one—including a movement deviant from the
main culture of the society—a system of ideas which is
oriented to the evaluative integration of the collectivity,
by interpretation of the empirical nature of the collectivity
and of the situation in which it is placed, the processes
by which it has developed to its given state, the goals to
which its members are collectively oriented, and their
relation to the future course of events
(Parsons [1951], pp.
354, 349).

The phrase "a sub-collectivity of one" suggests that
ideology may be a purely personal phenomenon. Par-
sons states in the same work, however, that ideology
refers "primarily" to the belief system of collectivities,
and he proposes to call the belief system of individuals
"personal ideology" (ibid., p. 331).

Moreover, it is clear from the larger definition, ide-
ology involves goal-directed behavior; it serves as a
basis for action toward improving the welfare of the
collectivity. It binds the community together, and it
legitimizes its value orientations. Finally, ideology
involves an element of distortion: "the strongly evalu-
ative reference of ideologies tends to link in with the
`wishful' or romantic-utopian element of motivation
which is present in every social system. There will
generally... be a tendency to ideological distortion
of the reality in the direction of giving reign to the
wishful element" (ibid., p. 357).

Elaborating on this point elsewhere, Parsons identi-
fies the "essential criteria of an ideology" as "deviations
from [social] scientific objectivity." He identifies two
types of deviations: one associated with the selectivity
with which ideologies approach problems and treat
issues; the other with the positive distortions of those
problems and issues that ideologies do choose to treat.
He writes: "The criterion of distortion is that state-
ments are made about the society which by social-
scientific methods can be shown to be positively in
error, whereas selectivity is involved where the state-
ments are, at the proper level, `true,' but do not consti-
tute a balanced account of the available truth" (Parsons
[1959], p. 38).

The "functional" approach to ideology—its action-
orientation, its ability to promote or undermine legiti-
macy, its potential for attaining social solidarity and
value integration—has been emphasized by Daniel
Bell. According to Bell:

Ideology is the conversion of ideas into social levers. With-
out irony, Max Lerner once entitled a book Ideas Are
Weapons.
This is the language of ideology. It is more. It
is the commitment to the consequences of ideas.... For
the ideologue, truth arises in action, and meaning is given
to experience by the "transforming moment." He comes
alive not in contemplation, but in "the deed."
(Bell [1960],
pp. 370-71). [Cf "Fascist Grand Gesture."]

Elsewhere, Bell defines ideology as
... an interpretative system of political ideas embodying
and concretizing the more abstract values of a polity (or
social movement) which, because of its claim to justification
by some transcendent morality (for example, history), de-
mands a legitimacy for its belief system and a commitment
to action in the effort to realize those beliefs
(Bell [1965],
p. 595, n. 6).

To sum up, the sociological approaches are centrally
concerned with ideology as a system of socially deter-
mined ideas, without necessary truth-value but with
great potential for social solidarity as well as for social
control, mobilization, and manipulation. In addition,
ideologies may serve to justify (or reject) a particular
set of goals and values and to legitimize (or denounce)
political authority. Some writers attach a derogatory
connotation to ideology, whereas others see it in a
neutral light.

Psychological Approaches. The psychological
theories see ideology primarily as a means of managing
personal strain and anxiety, whether socially or psy-
chologically induced. Among the most important of
the psychological theories are those of Sigmund Freud,
and of Francis X. Sutton and colleagues.
We may associate with Sigmund Freud a unique
approach to the concept of ideology, although to our
knowledge he nowhere undertakes an explicit analysis
of the subject. Page 557, Volume 2.

He does give a fairly extensive treatment of religion, and he does suggest that religion and ideology have much in common—indeed, that they
may belong to identical species of thought. Consider
the following statement, for example: "Having recog-
nized religious doctrines to be illusions, we are at once
confronted with the further question: may not all cul-
tural possessions, which we esteem highly and by which
we let our life be ruled, be of a similar nature? Should
not the assumptions that regulate our political institu-
tions likewise be called illusions?" (Freud [1957], p.
59). In a word, we would be well justified in substi-
tuting "ideology" wherever Freud uses "religion."
Freud's starting point is that man's life is governed
by instinctual drives, many of which are subconscious
or unconscious. These instincts are primarily of two
types: life instincts (Eros) and death instincts (Thanatos).
The demands of man's instinctual behavior are in con-
flict with those of society, culture, and civilization.
(The distinctions among these three concepts are not
crucial for our present purposes.) Indeed, the very
possibility of civilization lies in man's ability—volun-
tarily or otherwise—to divert, rechannel, and sublimate
his instinctual energies into more conventional behav-
ior. Culture and civilization demand sacrifices and
instinctual renunciations from the individual. This in
turn intensifies man's natural aggressiveness toward
society, so that "every individual is virtually an enemy
of culture" (ibid., p. 4). It also intensifies man's aggres-
siveness toward his fellow man, so that "civilized soci-
ety is perpetually menaced with disintegration through
this primary hostility of men toward one another"
(Freud [1958], p. 61). The ultimate consequence is war.
At the same time, aggressiveness creates a pervasive
sense of guilt under the pressure of the superego. If
culture and civilization are to exist, their prohibitions
must be internalized by the individual as an integral
part of his moral code. The individual must internalize
not only the prohibitions of culture but also "its herit-
age of ideals and artistic creations," for these ideals
offer "substitute gratifications for the oldest cultural
renunciations" (Freud [1957], pp. 71, 19; [1958], p. 15).
And now we come to the heart of Freud's argument:
"... the most important part of the psychical inven-
tory of a culture... is... its... religious ideas"
(Freud [1957], p. 20; cf. [1958], p. 38).

Religious conceptions are illusions. They are false-
hoods created to control man, restrain instinctual be-
havior, and perpetuate culture. Freud writes: "... re-
ligious doctrines... are all illusions, they do not admit
of proof, and no one can be compelled to consider them
as true or to believe in them.... [The] reality value of
most of them we cannot judge; just as they cannot be
proved, neither can they be refuted." The strength of
religious ideas lies in the fact that they are "fulfillments
of the oldest, strongest and most insistent wishes of
mankind; the secret of their strength is the strength
of these wishes" (Freud [1957], pp. 54, 51).

Religion (ideology), then, performs the function of
wish-fulfillment. It affords protection and security to
the individual; it controls instinctual behavior and
relieves man of his sense of guilt; it counteracts man's
alienation from society. (The concept of alienation is
implicit in Freud's argument that the undue demands
of civilization create a disjunction between man and
society, but he does not actually use the term.) Reli-
gious ideas "allay our anxiety in the face of life's dan-
gers, the establishment of a moral world order ensures
the fulfillment of the demands of justice, which within
human culture have so often remained unfulfilled, and
the prolongation of earthly existence by a future life
provides in addition the local and temporal setting for
these wish-fulfillments" (ibid., pp. 51-52).

Religion (ideology) is essential to man's psychological
well-being as well as to the continuity of culture.
Sutton and his colleagues offer a conception of ide-
ology as a response to strain generated by social roles.
Modern life, they argue, engenders a host of problems
and stress situations with which each man has to cope.
Individuals daily confront conflicting demands and
anxiety situations in the course of performing their
roles. Since human behavior is patterned in systems
of roles, so are the strains that these roles inescapably
generate.

Since man's reaction to strain is patterned rather
than random, individuals need some "guiding princi-
ples" in the light of which to react. Ideology is a system
of ideas that enables man to cope with strain. "Ideology
is a patterned reaction to the patterned strains of a
social role.... Where a role involves patterns of con-
flicting demands, the occupants of that role may re-
spond by elaborating a system of ideas and symbols,
which in part may serve as a guide to action, but chiefly
has broader and more direct functions as a response
to strain" (Sutton et al., pp. 307-08).

Although there is a basic relationship between ide-
ology and strain, the actual linkages are by no means
clear or simple, for the individual may react to strain
in a variety of ways, including pathological behavior,
Ideology is merely one way of responding to stress.
It is "a symbolic outlet" for emotional disturbances
generated by social and personal disequilibrium. This
includes release of emotional tension by displacing it
into symbolic enemies (e.g., scapegoatism). Ideology
performs the function of tension management and
sustains the individual in the face of continued stress.
The psychological approaches, then, focus on ideol-
ogy primarily in terms of its relation to the individual
and its consequences for social conduct. They are particularly interested in ideology as a means of stabilizing
the psychological makeup of the individual, equipping
him with an appropriate set of psychological reactions,
reconciling him to the conflicting demands of social
life, and providing relief from anxiety and strain.

Psychocultural Approaches. Among the psychocul-
tural approaches to ideology, the work of Léon Dion
and of Clifford Geertz may be examined. Dion refers
to ideology as "a more or less integrated cultural and
mental structure." By this he means a pattern of norms
and values that is both objective (cultural) and subjec-
tive (mental). More specifically:
Our hypothesis is that political ideology is a cultural and
mental complex which mediates between the norms associ-
ated with given social attitudes and conduct and the norms
which the political institutions and mechanisms tend to
crystallize and propagate. In other terms, political ideology
is a more or less integrated system of values and norms,
rooted in society, which individuals and groups project on
the political plane in order to promote the aspirations and
ideals they have come to value in social life
(Dion, p. 49).
Expressing dissatisfaction with the existing ap-
proaches to ideology, Clifford Geertz sets out to pro-
vide a more adequate nonvaluational theoretical
framework for its analysis. He approaches ideology in
terms of symbols and symbolic action, for he seeks to
show, at least in part, "how symbols symbolize, how
they function to mediate meanings" (Geertz, p. 57).
Geertz's initial assumption is that thought consists
of the construction and manipulation of symbol sys-
tems. Symbol systems, whether cognitive or expressive,
are extrinsic sources of information in terms of which
man's life is patterned (since intrinsic or genetic sources
of information are so few). Symbol systems are extra-
personal mechanisms for perception, judgment, and
manipulation of the world. Culture patterns—whether
religious, scientific, or ideological—are "programs"
that provide a blueprint for the organization of social
and psychological processes. More specifically, states
Geertz, "it is through the construction of ideologies,
schematic images of social order, that man makes him-
self for better or worse a political animal" (ibid., p. 63).
Ideology, in other words, is more than a mere psy-
chological response to strain; it embodies social and
cultural elements as well. Broadly understood, ideology
is a cultural symbol-system that aims to guide man in
his political life. The attempt of an ideology to render
confusing social situations meaningful accounts for its
highly symbolic form and for the intensity with which
it may be held. As such: "whatever else ideologies may
be... they are, most distinctively, maps of problem-
atic social reality and matrices for the creation of
collective conscience" (ibid., p. 64).
The psychocultural approaches, then, attempt to
unify the mental and the environmental elements in
ideology. In this view ideology requires both a psycho-
logical outlook and a cultural context. Its primary
function is to enable the individual to make sense of
the cultural symbol-system.

Summary. We have identified several approaches to
the concept of ideology and we have examined each
at some length. Each approach throws light on a
different dimension of the concept; together they re-
veal its extraordinarily rich and variegated intellectual
heritage. We may extrapolate from these approaches
a synthetic conception of ideology along the following
lines. Ideology is an emotion-laden, myth-saturated,
action-related system of beliefs and values about man
and society, legitimacy and authority, acquired as a
matter of routine and habitual reinforcement. The
myths and values of ideology are communicated
through symbols in simplified, economical, and efficient
manner. Ideological beliefs are more or less coherent,
more or less articulate, more or less open to new
evidence and information. Ideologies have a high po-
tential for mass mobilization, manipulation, and con-
trol; in that sense, they are mobilized belief systems.
***

Below we have a review of Derrida's inanities on aporia. There is much to write about this, of how the nihilism of "deconstruction" leads to quietism and defeatism of politically interested people. It leads to false positions of aporia as negatives that are in fact openings to further thought. Deconstruction is destruction in disguise.

Those who fall into the trap of Derrida's nihilist agenda are either driven to political despair or they are driven into nihilism as ideology. We'll leave it for the reader to decide what to make of it, open for now, undecided but optimistic about a further go round.
***

http://www.litencyc.com/

Aporia (=)

The words aporia and aporetic figure significantly and frequently in the writings of the French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) and in the deconstructive school of literary and cultural theory which his work inspired. Originating in the Greek, aporia involves doubt, perplexity and that which is impassable. Niall Lucy, in his A Derrida Dictionary (Blackwell: 2004), opens his entry on aporia with this definition: " aporia. A Greek term denoting a logical contradiction, "aporia" is used by Derrida to refer to what he often calls the "blind spots" of any metaphysical argument." The definition is useful, especially in alerting us to the issue of "blind spots", however it requires taking somewhat further. A more precise definition of the concept would be as follows: "a logical contradiction beyond rational resolution". We will see this more clearly if we add to Lucy's opening account the brief treatment of the term given in Nicholas Royle's Jacques Derrida in Routledge's Critical Thinkers series (2003). Royle begins by warning his readers not to immediately confuse the word aporia in Derrida's work with another word frequently employed by Derrida, abyss (see mise en abyme). Noting the Greek origins of the word ("a 'without', byssos 'depth' or 'bottom'"), Royle goes on to remind us that whilst an abyss is eminently passable (one in fact does nothing, if one falls into one, but pass through or down or up an abyss) an aporia, at least in its strict philological sense, is not passable. Royle states:

The abyss in this context thus corresponds with what might appear to be the quite contrary notion of aporia. "Aporia" is loosely a rhetorical term for "doubt" or "difficulty in choosing", but more precisely it means a sort of absolute blockage, a "No Way" ("aporia" again coming from ancient Greek, a "without", porous "way" or "passage"). Aporia, as Derrida has described it, is "a non-road" . . . In his terms, aporia entails "an interminable experience" . . . Like the experience of the undecidable, "the aporia can never simply be endured as such" (Aporias, Stanford U. P., 1993: 78).

Why Derrida would make that last statement, about the unendurable nature of the aporia or the aporetic, can be understood if we highlight within the concept the issue of reason and rationality. There are of course numerous definitions of reason: it is possible to say that the whole history of Western philosophy revolves around intense debates about the definition of reason. Despite this historical conflict over the word, there are many who would want to disallow any account of reason which did not in some way ground itself upon the Aristotelian law of non-contradiction. In Aristotle's law something (A) cannot at the same time be something else (-A, not-A). Any definition of a thing (say a species of animal) depends upon that thing not being something else; or, to put that more precisely, depends upon an exclusion of its other. In this sense our definition of say a cat will include, by implication, the fact that a cat is not any of the other definable animals on the planet: dogs, horses, elephants, monkeys, human beings, and so on. A cat (A) is defined on the law of non-contradiction by the exclusion of everything it is not (-A). This seems logical enough; in fact, this law of non-contradiction is the foundation of logic and thus of what we call reason and what we take to be reasonable. On this basis, one can understand why science, philosophy and indeed all intellectual disciplines have tended to ignore, or evade or even discount aporetic instances, aporetic phenomena. An aporia (a logical contradiction beyond rational resolution, beyond which we cannot pass) appears to challenge the very foundations of logic and thus reason. Aporias challenge our sense that we can describe, name, define and order the things which we encounter within the universe.

It is precisely this challenge to our sense of logic and reason which Derrida's deconstructive philosophy has always sought to highlight. Derrida does this, not because he is out to destroy the concepts of logic and reason, or because he is simply iconoclastic when it comes to reason; rather, he does this because of a profound understanding of the manner in which language and thought work within human systems and structures. We might, by way of example, follow up the example we have just utilised in order to establish the Aristotelian law of non-contradiction. On the basis of that law, we no doubt believe and would wish to state that a creature (say a cat) "A" cannot also be another creature (say a fish) "B" (or to express it properly within the law of non-contradiction, something cannot be at one and the same time A and not-A, and quite clearly a fish is not a cat). Our sense of distinction between species is, however, somewhat illogical in itself. As Jamie Shreeve, in an article on stem-cell research in The New York Times (April 10th, 2005), reminds us: "Ninety-nine percent of our genome is shared with chimpanzees. Thirty-one percent of our genes are interchangeable with those of yeast." Most of us have come a long way since Darwin's assertion of our relation to the other primates, and especially to the various species of apes and monkeys, caused such a theological melt-down in the nineteenth century. Yet, we still, for all our progress, do not walk around and live our lives thinking we are essentially hybrid animals or expecting to encounter what Shreeve calls "quasi-human chimeras." A chimera is, of course, a creature who defies the law of non-contradiction. In Greek mythology a chimera was precisely a monster: "1. A fire-breathing monster, with a lion's head, a goat's body, and a serpent's tail, killed by Bellerophon. 2. A grotesque monster. 3. A mere wild fancy; an unfounded conception." (OED) In modern usage a chimera is a fanciful, unfounded creature of the imagination. That's the modern meaning of the word. And yet we in ourselves are chimerical, from an evolutionary perspective. Moreover, modern science is increasingly capable of producing chimerical animals; that is, animals which, genetically, are part cat and part dog, or part chicken and part quail, or, much more disturbingly, sheep, mice, chimpanzees, pigs that, on a genetic level, are also part human. As Shreeve points out, "We have been engaging in unnatural acts upon nature for centuries, grafting plants onto one another or breeding dogs in visible shapes and sizes that diverge wildly from their natural state." But how far do we go with this kind of science? She asks: "What would you make of a sheep with a human face?" or a monkey able to sob in a distinctly human tone and manner? The answer is that you would feel uneasy at best, revolted and radically disturbed at worst. Human beings seem to need to construct a sense of order around them, which at the very same moment both the truth of how nature works and our own scientific explorations distinctly undermine.

It would appear that for science to exist we need logic and the law of non-contradiction. How could anyone operate as a scientist without this fundamental law? Yet it also would appear that today's science increasingly demonstrates that the species within the natural world (including ourselves) do not exist, and do not need to exist, within the boundaries which make up the law of non-contradiction. Science, in this sense, today confronts its own aporetic status; it is a discipline which depends upon and yet which cannot establish, and in fact keeps breaking, the very principles (of logic) upon which it is founded. Science is in this sense impossible, understanding that statement in its Derridean sense of aporetic: science must ground (define itself, operate on the basis of) logic, whilst it continually demonstrates the un-grounded (impossible) nature of that logic. In Derrida's work this experience of impossibility (working with and upon the foundation of a logic which is continually contravened and questioned) holds equally for philosophy and indeed for all the Human Sciences. In the work Derrida produced in the later years of his life, the aporetic experience of the impossible was also dramatically directed to the most profound ethical dimensions of human existence: to the law, to ideas of justice, of right, to ideas of hospitality, responsibility and friendship, amongst other issues.

In his The Politics of Friendship (Politiques de l'amitié 1994), for example, Derrida structures his discussion of friendship around the following statement traditionally attributed to Aristotle: "O my friends, there is no friend!" The statement encapsulates many things, including the traditional philosophical warning against having friends in too great a number. Such an issue alerts us to a major feature of Derrida's later work, namely the impossible (aporetic) nature of responsibility. In The Gift of Death (1995), for example, Derrida looks at responsibility in terms of Immanuel Levinas' phenomenological understanding of the Other. One has absolute responsibility towards the Other, argues Levinas. Such an idea is captured in the phrase tout autre est tout autre, which Derrida translates into English as every other (one) is every (bit) other. If one has responsibility towards an Other, as all human beings eventually do, then that Other is to be understood not as an example of humanity, not as an Other to whom one can switch on and off as one wishes, but rather as a unique, singular Other, demanding total (complete) responsibility. The most common relation in which such a total demand is experienced by human beings, of course, is in parental relations to children. One does not divide one's sense of responsibility between one's children, but rather thinks of each child as a unique, singular, complete Other. Derrida, however, takes the biblical story of Abraham and God's demand that he sacrifice his son, Issac, as a parable of the impossibility of such an understanding of responsibility. Abraham in the story, after all, is torn between two complete, total responsibilities, two complete, singular Others: his responsibility to God (which is total) and his responsibility towards his son (which is total). Most parents with more than one child have experienced in some form this "Abrahamic paradox" with one child in their bedroom requiring help with their homework, whilst another child in the garden demands assistance in repairing a punctured bicycle wheel! Unless the parent possesses the gift of bilocation, then they will inevitably experience their responsibility as an impossibility. Responsibility, when understood in terms of the phrase tout autre est tout autre, is aporetic, impossible. Yet that clearly does not mean that we, as ethical human beings, are excused from pursuing and meeting our responsibilities.

A similar aporetic quality is explored by Derrida in the ethics of hospitality. Again, starting with biblical and Greek precedents, Derrida demonstrates that hospitality depends upon the idea of welcoming the unwelcomed (the uninvited) guest: in Greek the xenos (the stranger or foreigner). If all one ever did was to welcome those guests one had in fact already invited then one could not really claim to be particularly hospitable. However, if hospitality depends upon welcoming the unwelcomed (uninvited) guest, the xenos, how can we safeguard our home and our nation from an unending flow of xenoi? The question, again, points out the aporetic nature of the law of hospitality (that one welcome uninvited guests), and as it does so it also foregrounds the manner in which ethical imperatives (like responsibility and hospitality) are necessarily undermined by the very thing which makes them active and possible in the world, that is the law. The law of hospitality, that is to say, may in fact be impossible to fully establish (constitute) as a law.

These examples of Derrida's more recent philosophical meditations on aporetic structures and principles are important in themselves, one could in fact go further and say they relate to the most pressing social and political problems which currently confront the nations of the world. They are also important, however, in that they demonstrate that Derrida's deconstructive philosophy, despite what is often said and written about it, is not solely concerned with problems of a purely linguistic character. It is true that throughout his career Derrida based a good deal of his most important work on following (tracing) the aporetic nature of key philosophical concepts: Plato's use of the pharmakon (both poison and cure), the hymen (both protective membrane denoting virginity and a concept denoting marriage), the supplement (a word involving that which adds to something and something that completes something), difference (a term which involves both difference and deferral) and so on. All these words (and they are chosen at random out of an arsenal of similar words in Derrida's work) are aporetic in that they present us with meanings which cannot be resolve into a singularity, a singular, stable meaning. One could add, of course, the word deconstruction itself, since, as Derrida has insisted on many occasions, it is a word which includes both destruction and construction within it.

To understand Derrida's work it is crucial that the reader understands the nature of aporia and the aporetic nature of deconstructive thinking and work. We would do well here to return to Nicholas Royle's brief discussion of aporia and abyss. Having apparently distinguished between these two concepts, on the basis that the former involves what is unpassable and the latter involves a constant passing through, Royle demonstrates how such an opposition is deconstructed in Derrida's work. If responsibility, friendship, hospitality, science, philosophy, language and law (in the sense of justice) are aporetic, then in fact we are always passing through aporias. As Royle suggests, quoting Derrida as he proceeds, if we cannot simply relegate the aporetic to the margins or to the trivial, if the most pressing and urgent of our ethical and intellectual activities involve a confrontation with the aporetic, then we will have to learn to put "in motion a new thinking of the possible". What this means is that we need to contemplate the possibility of living with and through what Derrida calls the impossible: whether it be in terms of science, identity, ethics, literature, philosophy, law or any other system which would attempt to define and to lay out the principles of our lives. An aporia is a logical contradiction without rational resolution: but it would appear that, if we follow Derrida's deconstructive philosophy, most of the things which are meaningful to us as human beings partake of such a definition. We have to attempt to be responsible, knowing responsibility is impossible (aporetic); we have to seek to be true friends, knowing friendship is impossible (aporetic); we have to seek to be hospitable, knowing that hospitality is impossible (aporetic), and so on. It is in this sense that Royle quotes what he styles "Derrida's extraordinary joint-proposition" from his Aporias: "The ultimate aporia is the impossibility of the aporia as such. The reservoir of this statement seems to me incalculable." Passing through (living through) (unresolvable) aporias, without succumbing to irrationalism; this is a viable description of what Derrida meant by deconstruction.
***

We hope you'll find things in the essays above that bring out questions. We leave the forum to our readers. Remember Keirkegaard's saying: "Not to decide is to think about it more."

Sunday, August 14, 2005

Out. Out Damned Spot.


In the most recent issue of the New England Journal of Medicine researchers reveal that Presbyterians are showing up in unprecedented numbers at doctors offices, medical clinics and emergency wards for treatment of seemingly inexplicable outbreaks of "spots."

In the Journal article one minister from Pennsylvania, who wishes to remain unidentified, said of his condition: "It started as a spot on my hand, and I couldn't get it off. I first noticed it while sitting on a parkbench where I was telling the world about the Evil Zionist Entity. I looked down, and there was the spot. I rubbed and rubbed, but it wouldn't come off. Gradually it began to spread."

"It was then I began to notice others in my congregation were wearing gloves, even in the heat of mid-summer. I inquired discreetly if they might be suffering, you know, 'spots?'"

Medical experts are baffled by the outbreak. One surgeon from Walter Reed Hospital said he had seen a similar outbreak, though on a smaller scale, while serving in Poland in the aftermath of WWII, but, he said, he had never seen so many cases as reported now among American Protestants, particularly among Presbyterians.

"I've tried almost everything I can think of to get the spots off," complained the minister from Pennsylvania. "I even tried Dhimmiwash. In fact, I ate the stuff straight out of the box. It made no real difference: I'm still slimy on the inside, and the spots are spreading. As you can see, my hands have gone from spotty to dripping bloody red."

When asked what advice he's gotten, the minister said: "One Right-wing religious bigot recommended prayer! Well, sophisticated people all know that God is so absent that there's no point in disturbing Her if we could. What, then, is the point? I mean, really?"

In a poll conducted by ND Times it was found that ill-tempered atheists voted 100 per cent in favor of the suggestion that Presbyterians suffering from the "Spots" malady should commit suicide.

"They're all a lot of bloody tossers," said one ill-tempered atheist/medical expert we spoke to. Summing up the general consensus he said: "Fook 'em."

No one, it appears, knows the cause of this outbreak. Medical experts hint that it might not be biologically based at all, but pharmaceutical companies are working overtime to find a new sedative to dampen the psychological effects of the sufferers.

"It's not really painful," admitted one Presbyterian minister from Pennsylvania. "but it looks so bad that we're afraid to show ourselves in public any more. People take one look at our hands, and they flee in horror."

"This attack has been cause of a lot of soul-searching among those of us in the ministry," said one Presbyterian named Drew, who wishes to remain as anonymous as possible. "We rapped about having a jazz vespers holiness meeting but the committee rejected it on the grounds that jazz in our church is a form of cultural expropriation. Instead, we've had a faith-based healing circle in which we had Elders from the Native Community come to introduce us to the Great Spirit Mother of the Ancestors who might guide us toward a higher understanding of these damned spots. We're giving some serious thought to Wicca rituals next."

Toward the end of the interview the minister leaned forward and whispered: "If all else fails we're going to blame it on the Joooos. The Joooos."

Suddenly, throughout the hospital corridor, the air was filled with a low and gutteral chant: "The Jooos! The Jooos!"

On Morality


The following essay is written prior to 9/11, and it does not address the problem of Islamic exceptionalism. The emphases are from the editor.

This post is in conjunction with "Archive: 6/09/05, 'The Cave of Islam.' The question is from whence comes legitimate moral authority, if there is such a thing. If so, is it universal, or does it apply only to those who are non -Muslims?

Pannenberg asks if people are morally autonomous. Some will suggest that is an either/or question, whereas we suggest that rather than being a question of ideology or religion it is a matter of aporia. Rather than argue from positions of religion or ideology or from ideological relativist nihilism, i.e. from a postion of Left dhimmi fascism, we argue from a postion of natural aporia, neither positivist ideology nor postivist nihilism, but aporetically from the starting point of new metaphors regarding legitimately authoritative universal morality. Good luck, huh?

Below is a wonderfully well-written essay, which we will leave as is beyond the added emphases. Those who ignore the author's points because he's a Christian theologian are missing... well, those anti-intellectual bigots won't show up here in the first place.

This essay deserves comment.


"When Everything is Permitted"


Wolfhart Pannenberg

Copyright (c) 1998 First Things 80 (February 1998): 26-30.

It is a striking oddity of our modern circumstance that the subject of morality and ethics is assumed to be a matter of public significance, while the subject of God is thought to be an esoteric matter of interest to theologians and "people who go in for that sort of thing." It was not always so, and it is very much worth asking how we arrived at this present circumstance, and what might be done about it.

Today's public talk about moral values is usually framed in terms of a search for a moral consensus that is no longer self-evident--indeed that to many people is not evident at all. The search for a moral consensus based on a common human nature has, for some time now, replaced the social function of religious belief, which was long thought to be the indispensable foundation of social peace. For most of history, unity of religion was deemed essential to the unity of society and culture. That assumption was shattered in the religious wars in Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As a consequence of the wars of religion, precisely the opposite conclusion was drawn: Social peace requires that religious beliefs, and disagreements over religious beliefs, be determinedly disregarded. Although established religion continued for some time in most of Europe, religion no longer served its earlier function. In the place of religion, concepts of human nature became fundamental in theories of society and public culture.

Among German thinkers, it was Wilhelm Dilthey who, toward the end of the nineteenth century, underscored the ways in which, beginning in the middle of the seventeenth century, human nature had replaced religion in European thought. Building on the reformulation of natural law by Hugo Grotius and on Thomas Hobbes' social contract theories, conceptions of natural morality and natural religion became fashionable and were increasingly pitted against revealed religion and morality. Nonetheless, for some time concepts of morality continued to employ a belief in God as the origin of moral norms and final judge of human behavior. The necessary connection between God and morality was preserved, for instance, in the thought of Herbert of Cherbury and John Locke. With Anthony Shaftesbury, however, the moral sense was treated as autonomous. Even in his case, however, while the moral sense was independent from religion, his ideal of harmony finally required harmony with God and the order of the universe.

The eighteenth century witnessed different approaches to whether there is human autonomy in morals or whether the moral sense depends on belief in God. David Hume argued the autonomous character of moral feeling, while Rousseau took the other course. While Rousseau thought conscience is the source of our knowledge about the duties of natural law, he also thought the conscience of man is in a bad way. In Rousseau's Emile, the Vicar of Savoy argues that the voice of conscience has almost been extinguished in most of us because of the overwhelming experience of human perversion and injustice. A purification of conscience is required, and that is possible only if we believe in God. If God does not exist, the vicar contends, then only the wicked are acting reasonably. It makes no sense to be good. In that event, the success of the wicked in this life would undermine the moral sense also of the good. This can be prevented only by the belief that there is a final recompense beyond this life in which everyone receives his due. Religion is therefore of public importance in Rousseau's Social Contract, although it is not revealed religion. Rather, he proposed a "civil religion" with only enough articles of faith to motivate moral behavior--belief in God as the origin of social order and law, in divine providence, and in a future recompense.

Although it is sometimes downplayed, Immanuel Kant was an admirer of Rousseau, and in his Critique of Pure Reason he adhered to the idea that moral conduct presupposed religion. Kant affirmed the autonomy of reason as the only source of our consciousness of moral law, but in his view the motivation of moral conduct presupposes a moral order in which each person will ultimately receive the measure of happiness or unhappiness appropriate to his merit. For this to be the case, there must be a harmony between the moral order and the course of nature, and that can be guaranteed only by a creator who, in his capacity as highest reason, is also the source of moral obligation. Without the existence of God, reason would be compelled to conclude that its intuition of moral law is a mere fiction.

This view of things posed the problem for Kant that it makes our moral sense dependent upon the existence of God, which contradicts the claim for the moral autonomy of reason. In his later years, therefore, Kant felt forced to attenuate the importance of religious belief in the sense of moral obligation. He now argued that religion is a consequence of moral consciousness, not a presupposition of moral obligation. In this case, belief in God and immortality only play the role of reconciling the demands of the moral law with our natural desire for happiness. This, however, looks an awful lot like eudaemonism--the theory that the highest moral goal is happiness--which was otherwise abhorrent to Kant. It is little wonder that Kant's philosophy of religion was soon considered the weakest part of his thought, while his principle of the autonomy of reason in moral philosophy was hailed as an epochal breakthrough.

II

In our situation today, there is little chance that the appeal to autonomous reason will bring about a broad consensus on moral norms. Even Kant would not expect that to happen, since he assigned to religion the task of introducing the moral principles of social conduct. He insisted only that the moral law should be the hermeneutical principle in transmitting religious belief, with the result that moral philosophy would take the lead in forming the moral consensus of society. Whether as Kantianism or as some form of utilitarianism, moral philosophy in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries did in fact replace religion among the intellectual elite and those whom they influenced. Both the Kantian and utilitarian forms of moral philosophy continued to affirm the public authority of moral norms, as well as their rational power to convince.

The authority of moral philosophy was dealt a severe blow, however, by Nietzsche's psychological analysis of the genealogy of moral values. What we call moral values, Nietzsche contended, are in fact in the service of deeper inclinations, propensities, and desires, especially the will to dominate others. The history of culture is the history of a struggle between different sets of moral norms. As a result, moral norms are relative, and the voice of conscience is in fact the voice of cultural context. This way of thinking was popularized and powerfully reinforced by Sigmund Freud and psychoanalysis, where we encounter the doctrine of the superego as the source of moral consciousness.

The relativizing of the formerly absolute authority of moral norms converges today with the emphasis upon individual freedom as the final authority in the conduct of life. In John Locke's philosophy, freedom is rooted in the concept of law. Today, freedom and law are pitted against each other. Moral and civil law are viewed as limits on the freedom of the individual. This is evident, for instance, in the constitution of my own country, Germany. There the freedom for self-realization is said to be limited by three factors: the justified claims of others, the moral law, and the order of positive law. Note what has happened, however, and I need not add that it has not happened only in Germany. Of the three limiting factors, the concept of moral law is no longer usable because there is no agreement about its content or obliging authority. It follows that "the justified claims of others" cannot be unequivocally asserted either, since we do not know what is and what is not justified. The end result is that the only limits on the exercise of individual freedom are the requirements of positive law. Morality and law are conflated, indeed equated, so that what is not illegal is not immoral. If it is not proscribed by law, others are expected to tolerate what the individual considers necessary to the exercise of his freedom. An unsurprising consequence of this is that positive law is often viewed as an arbitrary limitation of personal freedom.

Moral philosophy does not offer much help in this situation--not since 1903 when George Herbert Moore in Principia Ethica reduced moral judgment to intuitions that can be neither demonstrated nor refuted by rational argument. If that is the case, it is reasonable to view moral norms as emotion-driven preferences rather than the proper subject of rational argument. This is the intellectual and cultural circumstance brilliantly depicted in Alasdair MacIntyre's book of 1981, After Virtue, in which he shows how intuitivism and emotivism have caught up with Nietzsche's deconstruction of moral norms.

All that being said, however, we need not despair of the future of moral consciousness and moral argument. They are not going to disappear. There are several reasons why this is the case, not the least being the invincible propensity of human beings to judge the conduct of others. We are not going to stop judging, in private and in public. This is not due simply to our inclination to be "judgmental." Moral judgment is inextricably entangled with our very nature as social beings. We have no choice but to judge how people should behave in different situations. Situations demand it, whether we want to judge or not. It does not matter, at least at this level, whether the normative ideas presupposed in our judgment of the conduct of others are correct or fair. It is enough that such normative ideas are employed, and are promises. This is the "golden rule" of mutuality: What you don't want others to do to you you shouldn't do to them. Of course, the rule calls for further specification with respect to how people are differently situated, but in one way or another the principle of mutuality underlies our judgments of others. Human beings have a common interest in the basic requirements of social life, and mutuality is the basis of the basics.

This is not to suggest that people always act according to the golden rule of mutuality. Far from it. It is obviously easier to judge the conduct of others than to judge our own conduct. With respect to our own situation, we are marvelously adept at claiming exemptions from general rules. This is not only because we tend to be self-serving creatures. It is also because individual situations are indeed unique and do not always fit the general rules, and each of us can more easily perceive the uniqueness of our own situation than the uniqueness of the situation of another person. This is not a fault. It is natural. We should not be surprised that a person can have a strong sense of the general rules while, at the same time, being inclined to claim an exemption for himself. The temptation, of course, is to overstate the importance of individual particularity. Our knowledge of the norms observed by the majority can function as a condition for successfully claiming an exemption for ourselves. After all, none of us is the majority.

Precisely at this point the dissolution of the absolute authority of moral norms percolates into the conduct of individual lives. The crisis of moral consciousness is not that people no longer know about the general conditions and requirements of life together in society. The crisis comes in applying such knowledge to individual cases, and especially to our own. This includes the question of how the formulation and observance of general norms can be made subservient to individual preference. As a result of the inability to agree on the connection between general rules and individual cases, there is no consensus on the idea of justice. Justice requires that each person or group receives and contributes according to their placement within a social system. There is a cacophony of claims to justice, typically articulated in terms of "rights." But there is at present no consensus about the requirements of justice. In the absence of such a consensus, cries for justice appear as empty and self-serving moralism.

III

Conflicting claims about justice are not uniquely modern. There have always been such conflicts within societies and between societies, with the result of social disruption and wars among nations. In the biblical vision, the condition of lasting peace is a settlement of conflicting claims, a settlement that can come only from a higher authority recognized by all the parties in conflict. In Isaiah and Micah we have the vision of a pilgrimage of all the nations to Mount Zion, where the God of Israel settles their conflicting claims and establishes eternal peace. Of course the vision has to do with the last days. At present, the nations of the world do not seem inclined to have their claims adjudicated by the God of Israel. Some might appeal to the President of the United States, and a few might appeal to the Pope, but even those nations that share a Christian heritage do not acknowledge the authority of the God of Israel to settle their differences. Nor can the secularized societies of the West be expected to resolve their internal conflicts by recourse to the authority of God.

It may well be the case that the moral crisis of modern secular societies is attributable to the fact that God is no longer publicly recognized as the source of moral norms. As long as such a recognition was intact, the absolute validity of moral norms and the individual sense of obligation to those norms were secure. Historical experience demonstrates that, for societies and for individuals, the autonomy of reason cannot successfully replace the authority of God. In this respect, Rousseau is fully vindicated. As is Dostoyevsky, whose Ivan Karamazov observed that, without God, "everything is permitted." In a 1970 interview, the Marxist philosopher Max Horkheimer declared that, at least in the West, everything related to morals is ultimately traceable to theology. We may want to qualify that by noting that the tradition of moral philosophy goes back to classical Greece and therefore does not have all its roots in the Judeo-Christian faith in the God of Israel. And qualify it further by noting that a disposition to benevolence, a benevolence that takes pleasure in the happiness of others, is part of human nature. Nonetheless, the sense of moral obligation as it was cultivated for the last fifteen hundred years is hardly conceivable apart from faith in the God of the Bible.

The fact remains that in our Western and secularized societies the public authority of religion, meaning mainly Christianity, will not easily be restored. The more promising prospect is for a renewal of a specifically Christian morality within the Christian community itself. Here attention must be paid to a Christian way of living that is clearly distinguished from the conventional ways of the surrounding culture. There are important objections to what seems to be a turn inward that focuses moral reasoning on the development of a distinctive ethic for the Christian community. The most important objection is that morality, by its very nature, is related to what is universally human. There is something inherently wrong with a sectarian ethic. Moral discourse in Christian theology, as in philosophy, attends to human nature, the needs and aspirations of all. It does not attend only, or even in the first place, to the special concerns of Christians. In the history of Christian ethics, Christian ethics is not only for Christians.

This universal concern is overwhelmingly evident from the time of the early Church Fathers. Christian ethics addresses all human beings as creatures of the one God; all are involved in the fall of Adam, and all are called to reconciliation with God, liberation from the bondage of sin and death, and final glorification in communion with God, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This understanding of the nature and history of mankind explains the missionary imperative of Christianity. It is grounded in the belief that all humanity and the entire universe is created by the God of Israel who revealed himself definitively in Jesus Christ. True, this understanding is no longer shared by everybody in our societies, and it therefore does not characterize the spirit of our public culture. It is viewed as an understanding peculiar to Christians. But it is nonetheless a Christian understanding that embraces all human beings.

Christian ethics, then, is not limited to Christians but is related to the moral situation and calling of all. This is the connection between the particular and universal in Christian thought, and it is a connection that must be honored also today in Christian moral reasoning. There can be no turning inward to the Christian community that excludes Christian claims and Christian concerns about the universal condition and destiny of human beings as such. As the early Church integrated the classic catalogue of virtues into the Christian doctrine of virtue that culminates in the Pauline triad of faith, hope, and love, so Christian ethics today must comprehend all that is true in moral reasoning beyond the formal boundaries of Christianity itself. We dare not forget that John 3:16 begins with, "God so loved the world . . ." Christian ethics that is worthy of the name understands itself to be a moral account of and for the world.

We have now addressed the first objection to a Christian ethics that addresses itself specifically to the conduct of the Christian community. A second objection arises from the peculiar history of Protestantism. While Roman Catholic moral teaching has traditionally been articulated in tension with modernity, Protestantism has understood itself to be working in tandem with the development of the modern world. This is notably true of liberal Protestantism, what is often called the "cultural Protestantism" once dominant in much of Europe and North America. This Protestantism is reluctant to differ from the prevailing values of the general culture. Indeed, it feels it has a proprietorial interest in those values. This attitude can be traced to the Reformation, and especially to Luther's doctrine that the Christian is fulfilling his divine vocation by doing the work he is called to in the secular sphere. This was in sharpest contrast to the Roman Catholic view that there are, for instance in monasticism, special vocations to holiness. Moreover, and very important to our discussion of moral authority, Protestantism took credit for the development of modern ideas of liberty and human rights. As a result, Protestants viewed adaptation to modern culture not as a course of moral compromise but as a course of fidelity to their heritage.

Examples could be multiplied to illustrate the ways in which Protestantism identified with the general culture, even when it also attempted to transform it. That identification appears to be jeopardized when Christian ethics turns its attention to the community of faith rather than the general culture. Such a turn to the community is suspected of sectarianism, especially when the accent is on Christian separation from the ways of the world, or when the commandment to love one's neighbor is understood chiefly as a responsibility to Christian brothers and sisters. Yet we must entertain the possibility that a seemingly sectarian turn to the community, and away from a general culture that is alienated from its Christian heritage, may contribute very significantly to the moral renewal of that culture. In the early Church, Christians lived a very different morality from that of the surrounding culture, and their courage to be different became one of the powerful attractions of Christianity. People recognized that the Christian ethic was superior and worthy of emulation. We should not discount the possibility of that happening again.

A third objection to the proposal that Christian ethics should turn to the community of faith arises from the Christian idea of love. Does not the call to unconditional love require us to accept people just as they are? That unconditionality seems to be compromised if we discriminate between Christians and non-Christians or make demands of people. In the name of love, the apostolic admonitions not to have fellowship with people who live in violation of apostolic teaching are easily disregarded. But Christian love has a critical edge. It cannot be equated with unconditional "acceptance." Love is ready to accept everyone, but also calls everyone to change. To the adulteress of John 8, Jesus said, "Go, and sin no more." When, in telling the story of his acceptance of the woman, we omit that admonition, we break the connection between the commandment to love our neighbor and the prior commandment to love God. One cannot love God without obeying his will, and in the teaching of Jesus the love of God is both the source and criterion of our obligation to love others. People are to be loved in light of the destiny intended for them by their Creator.

In the Old Testament, the love of God is expressed in his electing a people for himself and in his persevering in that act of election. This is the source and criterion of all moral obligation. Because God wants his elect people to flourish, every member of that community is required to observe the minimal conditions of the community's flourishing. This explains the correspondence between the second table of the Decalogue and the truths of natural law that are essential to communal life. No human community is possible where people murder one another, steal one another's possessions, violate their marriages, dishonor their parents, or injure one another by slander.

The moral teaching of Jesus was also derived directly from the authority of God and his love, not from the authority of the tradition's legal and moral teaching. In Matthew 6, for instance, the love of the Creator for his creatures is evident in that "he makes his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust." Thus are we to follow God's example, loving not only our friends but also our enemies. Again and again, Jesus taught that, as the love of the heavenly Father is expressed in his forgiveness of us, so also are we obliged to forgive others. Thus he taught us to pray, "Forgive us our sins as we forgive those who sin against us." God's forgiveness is prior, as the source and criterion of our forgiving.

This understanding of love is the Christian contribution to ethical discourse and universal morality. Christian love enriches and strengthens the natural inclination of human beings to benevolence, which is always in desperate need of being strengthened. This is the most important Christian contribution to moral life in general, also under the conditions of modern secular societies. But Christians also need to point out that benevolence and the joy that comes with it are evidence of a deeper longing of human nature for the good. The good for which the human being longs is not limited to the moral good. It is the good understood in the Platonic sense, meaning the good that is the source of happiness. It is, in short, a longing for God, the source of ultimate and lasting happiness. In benevolence, there is a glimpse of that ultimate good, accompanied by the experience of happiness. It is a hint of the kingdom to come.

Our sighting of that kingdom, however, does not lead to indifference to the quotidian conditions of human community. On the contrary, where mutual benevolence holds sway, those conditions are met without further ado. In the words of Paul, "Therefore, if any one is in Christ, he is a new creation; the old has passed away, behold, the new has come." If Christian ethics attends to the living out of this new way--a new way that is the fulfillment of our nature from the beginning--the world may again take note. Then, at last, we may overcome the striking oddity of our modern circumstance that the subject of morality and ethics is assumed to be a matter of public significance, while the subject of God is thought to be an esoteric matter of interest to theologians and "people who go in for that sort of thing." Then, at last, our culture may be renewed by understanding that we do not need to choose between nature and religion, and that freedom, far from being limited when ordered to moral authority, is not possible without it.


Wolfhart Pannenberg is Professor of Systematic Theology at the University of Munich and founding director of the Institute of Ecumenical Theology.
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